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Putting a price on human rights? A policy-based approach for the 
protection of human rights in Europe 
Stefanos Xenofontos* 
 
Abstract 
 
Ongoing political uncertainty in Europe, as a result of, inter alia, Brexit, the rise of populism 
and nationalism, places the fundamental principles of democracy, rule of law and human 
rights under threat across the entire continent. The European Commission, in seeing certain 
EU Member States adopting national policies that severely compromise the state of the rule 
of law within the Union and in an effort to compel them to honour their international legal 
obligations, has recently proposed to make access to EU funds conditional on the respect for 
the rule of law. In critically analyzing this proposal, this paper presents a series of skepticisms 
on the wider human rights situation within Europe. Particularly, the paper questions whether 
the current juridical paradigm for human rights protection has been proven ineffective, 
whether alternative methods of protection are needed and whether funds could promote the 
rule of law and human rights in Europe. The paper concludes by suggesting that a paradigm 
shift, from a rights-based to a policy-based system, which includes diplomatic and economic 
incentives, could be an effective and appropriate response to the rule of law backsliding in 
the EU and a plausible alternative for the protection of human rights across Europe.   
 
I. Introduction 
International organisations such as the European Union (EU) and the Council of Europe 
(CoE) are values-based organisations. Both the Treaty on European Union (TEU) and the EU 
Charter of Fundamental Rights refer to these values upon which the European Union is 
founded. These values are “respect for human dignity, freedom, democracy, equality, the 
rule of law and respect for human rights, including the rights of persons belonging to 
minorities” (Art. 2 TEU). Similarly, the Statute of the Council of Europe, the constituent 
instrument of the Organisation, as well as the European Convention on Human Rights 
(ECHR) identify respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms, democracy and the 
rule of law as the Organisation’s founding principles. As this tripartite (democracy, human 
rights, rule of law) is interdependent, none of these principles can be seen in disassociation 
with each other. States must therefore conduct their functions with conformity with these 
principles, both on the national and international level, as they should represent and honour 
the European values as a result, inter alia, of their membership in these international 
organisations. 
*PhD researcher, Birmingham Law School, University of Birmingham. The present paper was prepared as part 
of the author’s presentation at the Biennial (VI) Conference on European Law & Policy in Context, organised by 
the University of Birmingham’s Institute of European Law (28-29 July 2018). Many thanks to Prof Jean-Baptiste 
Velut for his comments on an earlier draft. 
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In recent years, however, both the EU and the CoE have struggled to respond effectively 
when their Member States have not shown the required respect for these fundamental 
values and principles. As shown, ongoing political uncertainty in Europe and the general 
political environment of the last years has affected the way certain States perceived and 
deal with these values. Populist movements, primarily on the extreme right, have flourished 
in many European countries. By instumentalising the various political, economic and social 
crises that have hit Europe in the past decade, including the growing threat of terrorism and 
the ongoing migration/refugee crisis, many of these populist parties espouse ideologies 
which are at odds with the European fundamental values and principles. 
Within the European Union, for example, Hungary’s ruling party Fidesz, under the 
government of Viktor Orbán, has recently put forward a series of judicial reforms aiming, 
essentially, at removing checks and balances on its executive powers.1 These reforms 
included the lowering of the retirement age of senior judges, and thus forcing them to leave 
their posts and replacing them with the government’s own supporters, while adopting also 
certain measures against public media. Similar measures were also taken by Poland’s 
coalition government led by the Law and Justice (PiS) party.2 According to the European 
Commission, these so-called reform measures seek to diminish the independence and 
impartiality of the judiciary and the public media and undermine the rule of law 
domestically while also severely threatening to shock the very foundations of the EU.3 The 
rule of law backsliding in Poland has led the EC to start infringement proceedings against the 
country under Article 7 TEU for the first time ever in the history of the Union.4 Malta and 
certain Eastern European States, including Romania, have been also targeted by the EU 
Institutions over several democratic deficiencies as evidence for high levels of corruption 
and censorship of public media and the free press were identified on the domestic level.5 
 The Council of Europe has not remained unaffected by these rule of law crises. In 2017, the 
Committee of Minister, the executive body of the Council of Europe, launched infringement 
proceedings against Azerbaijan due to the persistent refusal of the latter to enforce a 2014 
ECtHR judgment requiring the immediate and unconditional release of an opposition 
politician.6 Notably, this marks the first time ever in the history of the Organisation, and 
                                                           
1 Laurent Pech and Kim Lane Scheppele, ‘Illiberalism Within: Rule of Law Backsliding in the EU’ (2017) 19 
Cambridge Yearbook of European Legal Studies 3. 
2 Ibid. 
3 See eg, European Commission, ‘Rule of Law: Commission discusses latest developments and issues 
complementary Recommendation to Poland’ (Press Release, 21 December 2016), available at 
<http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-16-4476_en.htm >. 
4 European Commission, ‘Rule of Law: European Commission acts to defend judicial independence in Poland’ 
(Press Release, 20 December 2017), available at <http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-17-5367_en.htm >. 
5 European Parliament, ‘Rule of Law in Malta: MEPs demand police investigate all corruption allegations’ (Press 
Release, 24 January 2018), available at < http://www.europarl.europa.eu/news/en/press-
room/20180123IPR92315/rule-of-law-in-malta-meps-demand-police-investigate-all-corruption-allegations  >; 
Carmen Paun, ‘Romanian President: EU can’t link funding to rule of law’ (Politico, 20 April 2018), available at 
<https://www.politico.eu/article/romanian-president-eu-cant-link-funding-to-rule-of-law/>. 
6 Council of Europe, ‘Committee of Ministers launches infringement proceedings against Azerbaijan’ (Press 
Release, 5 December 2017), available at < https://www.coe.int/en/web/portal/news-2017/-
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since the introduction of the measure in 2010 as part of the reforms of Protocol No. 14 to 
the ECHR. that infringement proceedings based on Article 46 ECHR are used against an ECHR 
Contracting Party because of the non-execution of an ECtHR judgment. 
Without prejudice to European Union law, and especially EU Constitutional law, this paper 
seeks to critically examine the recent legislative proposal (hereinafter ‘the proposal’) by the 
European Commission (EC)  on making access to EU funds conditional on its Member States’ 
rule of law performance from a pure human rights law and theory perspective.7 The paper 
essentially looks at whether EC’s proposal can be seen as an indirect assumption that the 
traditional juridical paradigm for the protection and enforcement of human rights has 
proven ineffective and whether alternative methods of protection are needed. 
Furthermore, it looks at whether a policy-based system, one that offers diplomatic and 
economic incentives, could be an effective and appropriate response to the rule of law 
backsliding within the EU and a plausible alternative for the protection of human rights and 
other fundamental values across Europe. 
 
II. The EC Proposal: the key point and an initial aspect for problematisation 
According to the proposal, depending on the severity of the rule of law violation, the EC 
could suspend or restrict access to funds for the non-compliant Member State.8 On the 
contrary, Member States that comply with their rule of law requirements can gain access to 
additional funds, while it was also suggested that member States which perform particularly 
well regarding their rule of law and other fundamental values obligations could be rewarded 
with extra funds.9 
While the EC, in putting forward its proposal, has recognised that recent political 
developments in Europe have exposed generalised weaknesses in certain EU Member 
States’ national checks and balances, with all the potentially dangerous consequences this 
may entail regarding the status of the rule of law within the Union, the effectiveness of the 
existing EU mechanisms to address these situations remained unchallenged.10 It is thus 
                                                                                                                                                                                      
/asset_publisher/StEVosr24HJ2/content/council-of-europe-s-committee-of-ministers-launches-infringement-
proceedings-against-azerbaijan? >. 
7European Commission,  Proposal for a REGULATION OF THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND OF THE COUNCIL 
on the protection of the Union's budget in case of generalised deficiencies as regards the rule of law in the 
Member States (COM/2018/324 final - 2018/0136 (COD)), available at <https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-
content/EN/TXT/?uri=COM%3A2018%3A324%3AFIN >. See also, Eszter Zalan, ‘Justice Commissioner links EU 
funds to ‘rule of law’’ (EUobserver, 31 October 2017), available at <https://euobserver.com/political/139720 >. 
8 Art 4(1) of the proposal (n 7). 
9 See eg,  Jasna Selih, Ian Bond and Carl Dolan, ‘Can EU funds Promote the Rule of Law in Europe?’ (Centre for 
European Reform, November 2017), available at  
<http://www.cer.eu/sites/default/files/pbrief_structural_funds_nov17.pdf > 2.  
10 European Commission,  Proposal for a REGULATION OF THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND OF THE COUNCIL 
on the protection of the Union's budget in case of generalised deficiencies as regards the rule of law in the 
Member States (COM/2018/324 final - 2018/0136 (COD)), p 1, available at <https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-
content/EN/TXT/?uri=COM%3A2018%3A324%3AFIN >. 
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deemed purposeful to examine whether the existing enforcement mechanisms, including 
the traditional juridical paradigm, for the protection of fundamental values and principles 
are still fit for purpose. In looking at the broader picture of human rights protection in 
Europe, the paper, therefore, asks if the EC’s proposal should shift the focus on whether the 
existing enforcement mechanisms for the protection of fundamental values on the 
international, and more specifically European, level have proven ineffective and/or 
insufficient to respond to current multifaceted challenges which seriously undermine the 
respect for human rights and the rule of law in Europe. 
 
III. Limitations in using effectively the existing enforcement mechanisms for 
the protection of human rights in Europe 
 Political limitations: 
International organisation, such as the European Union and the Council of Europe, operate 
within a complex and highly political structure. It is well established that international law is 
not self-enforcing and, therefore, its implementation at the national level depends almost 
entirely on the voluntary political will of the national authorities (despite some (political or 
economic) pressures from the international community). To be enforced at all, international 
law ultimately relies on the political will and co-operation of domestic authorities (i.e. 
executives, parliaments and courts). This reality makes the enforcement of international 
human rights law, and for present purposes, the protection and promotion of human rights 
in Europe even more difficult. As it has been acknowledged, “Respect for human rights is a 
legal obligation. Defending them is a political and diplomatic act”.11 
This phenomenon reflects also the reality within the EU and the CoE. Aware of these 
political limitations and the difference in dynamics within international organisations, 
member States are often unwilling to start infringement proceedings (under Art 7 TEU and 
Art 46 ECHR on the EU and the CoE level respectively) against their non-compliant 
counterparts, something which makes the organisations’ existing enforcement mechanisms 
no longer a credible and effective deterrent.12 Although the Committee of Ministers within 
the CoE context has managed to launch infringement proceedings in the case of Azerbaijan 
under Art 46(4) ECHR for the first time ever in the history of the Organisation (precise 
outcome under Art 46(5) ECHR is still unknown as the process is ongoing), it is very unlikely 
that the proceedings will lead to a desired outcome. Similarly, it is very unlikely, that any 
strict measures under Article 7 (3) TEU will be taken against Poland within the EU context 
because of the lack of necessary consensus (unanimity) on the European Council level (Art 7 
                                                           
11 Emmanuel Macron (French President), Speech at the European Court of Human Rights (31 October 2017), 
available at <http://www.echr.coe.int/Documents/Speech_20171031_Macron_ENG.pdf>. 
12 See eg, Maria Fletcher, ‘Article 7 sanctions: a legal expert explains the EU’s ‘nuclear option’’, (The 
Conversation, 28 July 2017) available at <http://theconversation.com/article-7-sanctions-a-legal-expert-
explains-the-eus-nuclear-option-81724>. 
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(2) TEU). As political development to date have shown, Article 7 TEU seems to be ineffective 
when it comes to triggering sanctions, exactly because of this high political threshold 
requiring unanimity by the European Council in determining whether a serious and 
persistent violation of EU values in the scrutinised State exists.13 
Legal scholars have supported the view that addressing, for example, non-execution of 
ECtHR judgments through infringement proceedings is misguided and unlikely to be 
effective or useful because, essentially, the mechanism is not “fit for purpose”, and does not 
necessarily lead to the desired result.14 Following a similar line of thought, and as the EC’s 
ongoing infringement proceedings against Poland demonstrate so far, the EU’s law 
enforcement mechanisms are not always effective and they sometimes fail to respond to 
the principled disagreement of certain member States to comply with certain laws and 
principles and/or their persistent refusal to enter into any kind of constructive dialogue 
(political or judicial) on the issue at stake.15 Even if the high practical hurdle of the required 
unanimity of the European Council (Art 7 (2)) for the infringement proceedings to move 
forward is overcome, similar coercive measures have been proven counterproductive and 
may lead to a possible backlash against the EU amid an already intense political climate 
which can only add fuel to the fire of national populist discourse and Euroscepticism. 
 
Financial limitations 
It should not be disregarded that the effective institutional functioning of these 
Organisations heavily depends on the financial contributions from their Member States. The 
considerable budget differences between the EU and the CoE should also be borne in mind 
when assessing the effectiveness of their own enforcement mechanisms for the protection 
of human rights or when making proposals for alternative mechanisms of protection and 
compliance. Although the newly proposed measure of the EC can be an appropriate 
alternative for the protection of human rights and the respect for the rule of law in the EU, 
this might not be the case for the CoE. This point will be further explored later in this paper.  
 
 
 
                                                           
13 See eg, Daniel McLaughlin, ‘Hungary vows to block any EU bid to punish Poland over reforms’ (The Irish 
Times, 22 December 2017) available at <https://www.irishtimes.com/news/world/europe/hungary-vows-to-
block-any-eu-bid-to-punish-poland-over-reforms-1.3336450>. 
14 Fiona de Londras and Kanstantsin Dzehtsiarou, ‘Mission Impossible? Addressing Non-Execution Through 
Infringement Proceedings in The European Court of Human Rights’ (2017) 66(2) International and Comparative 
Law Quarterly 467. 
15 See, decision of the European Commission to start infringement proceedings against Poland,  n 4 above. See 
also, M. Apelbat, ‘European Commission enters dialogue with Poland on Rule of Law’ (The Brussels Times, 12 
April 2018), available at <http://www.brusselstimes.com/eu-affairs/10977/european-commission-s-enters-
dialogue-with-poland-on-rule-of-law>. 
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Conceptual / Normative limitations 
The nature, definition and interpretation of these European values (democracy, human 
rights and rule of law) is not always straightforward. For example, the rule of law can be 
considerably undermined without a government having to violate the letter of the law (e.g. 
a specific provision under EU law). Similarly, a mere post facto compliance with a particular 
law or in a particular case cannot automatically ensure full compliance with the spirit of the 
rule of law as this may not resolve the systemic and structural deficiencies of the national 
legal system. This creates further difficulties as the practical application of these concepts 
becomes ever more complex, lengthy, and often controversial. 
Given the wide range of these limitations, international institutions (the EU and CoE in 
particular) need to protect and enforce their founding values and principles more effectively 
and develop appropriate alternatives to ensure that their Member States abide by them. 
The respect for the rule of law within international organisations such as the CoE and the EU 
is of primary importance for two main reasons; a functional and a philosophical one. 
Functional, because effective protection of the rule of law through judicial cooperation as 
perceived under the concepts of collective enforcement and subsidiarity within the ECHR 
context and mutual trust within the EU context can ensure the proper functioning of the 
different institutions within these organisations, including the courts, which leads to a more 
effective and enhanced protection of other fundamental values and principles, such as 
human rights and democracy. Philosophical, because the establishment of these 
organisations are founded upon these European values and principles and as such they form 
the cornerstone for their further development and success. 
 
IV. The need for alternative enforcement mechanisms for the protection of 
human rights and other fundamental values 
As it has been stated above, human rights are standards for domestic governments whose 
breach is a matter of international concern as it affects the functioning and threatens the 
foundations of the international organisations of which they are members. Taken in this 
context, the framers of international human rights law decided that human rights were to 
form part of the domestic law or policy of the State and be enforced in domestic courts. The 
international role was limited in monitoring compliance at the domestic level and acting 
where domestic enforcement was determined to have failed. Ideally, the framers would 
intend to create an international judicial body to monitor domestic compliance of human 
rights by juridical means of an international scale in the form of an international human 
rights court. This juridical paradigm of implementation, in reality, was only achieved on a 
regional level with the creation of regional human rights systems, most notably the 
European regional system and (not until the late 1990s) the European Court of Human 
Rights in its present form. The framers, therefore, believed that a juridical paradigm of 
implementation, primarily concentrated in domestic mechanism of States and overseen by 
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international or regional judicial mechanisms, was the most effective and most appropriate 
means to ensure respect and enforcement of the human rights obligations of States. 
However, in recent years we witness a significant growing body of human rights violations 
and a growing number of non-compliant States, something which raises concerns over the 
effectiveness and appropriateness of the wider implementation system and whether an 
alternative mechanism to make States abide by the human rights legal obligations should be 
found. 
As the traditional mechanisms for dealing with breaches of human rights and other 
fundamental values has been proven flawed, a proposed alternative enforcement 
mechanism could be a policy-based, or incentive-oriented, system aimed at inducing respect 
for human rights obligations by threatening political or economic sanctions against States in 
cases of non-compliance. However, since the effectiveness of sanctions is highly contested, 
other means of enforcement could be considered outside coercive threats. A reverse 
approach to sanctions, one that offers incentives to States when they meet certain 
obligations, could be a possible alternative. Another alternative to encourage respect for 
human rights is by offering diplomatic or economic incentives to States, including 
preferential treatment in economic relations, offering access to economic, social and 
cultural resources and as a requirement to establish bilateral agreements or gain 
membership in international organisations.16      
It is now established that human rights are an essential component of the rule of law in 
international affairs and global politics. A commitment to human rights doctrine and 
practice has now become an integral part and goal of the domestic and foreign policy of 
individual States as well as international organisations, such as the European Union.17 On 
the EU level, for example, member States can benefit from the various EU funds, which are 
designed to enable further European integration and promote certain social, economic and 
cultural rights and policies. The Member States have access to funds, acting as financial 
incentives, to realise their legal obligations. Notably, the recent proposals by the EC on 
making access to EU funds conditional on States’ performance regarding their human rights 
and rule of law obligations were made after certain EU Member States failed to comply with 
their legal obligations with respect to certain fundamental values and principles. It is 
believed that this kind of politico-economic policies, on the basis of incentives, will be more 
effective in the protection and implementation of human rights than the mechanisms 
traditionally used under the existing juridical paradigm.18 
 
 
                                                           
16 Charles R. Beitz, The Idea of Human Rights (OUP, 2011) 33-39. 
17 See eg, Lorand Bartels, Human Rights Conditionality in the EU’s International Agreements (OUP, 2005); 
Armin Von Bogdandy, ‘The European Union as a Human Rights Organisation? Human Rights and the Core of 
the European Union’ (2000) 37 Common Market Law Review 1307. 
18 See eg, Jasna Selih, Ian Bond and Carl Dolan (n 9). 
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V. The case of an incentives-based approach for the protection of human 
rights: The EC proposal in context 
Advantages: 
A flexible and practical approach 
A policy-based mechanism for the enforcement of human rights which is based on economic 
or political incentives is a flexible and practical approach which can be proved a good 
alternative to the existing insufficient implementation and enforcement mechanisms of 
fundamental values. An incentives-based system for the protection of fundamental values 
and principles can be an innovative and original approach which can provide answers to the 
various multifaceted and pressing challenges currently faced by the EU (e.g. migration).  
Imposing sanctions or offering incentives in order to encourage compliance with certain 
obligations is often considered the two sides of the same coin as both means have the same 
objective. Instead of imposing sanctions with a much coercive and punitive character, which 
often bears a negative connotation (i.e. if a State does something wrong, it gets punished), 
however, EC’s new proposal suggests that when States meet their legal obligations, they get 
rewarded by either retaining access to EU funds or gaining access to additional funds. The 
present proposal provides a more positive approach and presents compliance with 
fundamental principles and values as a rewarding incentive, rather than a strict obligation or 
even a burden for Member States.  
Expert reports suggest that EU funds and other similar policy-based mechanisms have a 
more direct impact and are capable of contributing more effectively to the long-term 
political and economic development of the Member States. As a result, the rule of law and 
other fundamental values are better safeguarded.19 Indeed, respect for the rule of law is 
directly linked with good public administration and management of public finances, 
minimised corruption levels, economic growth and an independent, effective and stable 
legal system which forms the basis for the better protection and enforcement of human 
rights.20    
Political and economic incentives have proven in the past to be effective in achieving 
positive legal and policy reforms on the national level. Instead of obliging non-compliant 
States to pay large financial penalties, as the practice has been so far, the EC’s proposal, 
adopting a reverse approach, and arguably a less coercive or punitive one, suggests that EU 
funds are to be suspended or restricted pending a successful removal of the infringement by 
the violating State. Additionally, it has been suggested that member States which perform 
particularly well regarding their rule of law and other fundamental values obligations could 
                                                           
19 See eg, Jasna Selih, Ian Bond and Carl Dolan (n 9). 
20 See, European Commission, The 2018 EU Justice Scoreboard (Fact sheet, May 2018), available at 
<https://ec.europa.eu/info/sites/info/files/justice_scoreboard_2018_factsheet_en.pdf>.  
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be rewarded with extra funds. This could provide an added incentive for the Member States 
to comply with their fundamental values obligations, including following courts’ judgments 
against them.21 
A strategic and targeted approach 
The EC’s proposal is not only flexible and practical, but also a strategic and targeted one. It is 
based on the fact that most serious violations22 of the Union’s founding values and 
principles occur by those member States which are also the biggest beneficiaries of the EU 
Funds.23 Indeed, Poland is by far the biggest beneficiary of the EU regional and cohesion 
funding for the period 2014-2020, while Hungary is also among the biggest funding 
recipients for the same period.24 It is no surprise, therefore, that the proposal is particularly 
supported by the biggest contributors to the EU budget, including Germany and France, 
who, at a time where European societies are confronted with numerous challenges, would 
like to ensure that EU money is spent to promote and strengthen justice, human rights and 
other EU values. Withholding EU funds from these States will be politically and economically 
detrimental for them, and it thus expected that the measure will exercise the necessary 
pressure on rogue States’ governments to proceed with actual, rather than just symbolic, 
compliance with EU values.25 
 
Points of skepticism:  
Different dynamics within European organisations 
Although this policy may be proved an effective and appropriate alternative with positive 
results for a particular international organisation (e.g. EU), this might not necessarily be the 
case for another organisation (e.g. CoE) due to significant differences in their financial 
resources. While the EU can easily stream billions of Euros to its various Funds, the CoE, 
having significant budgetary limitations, simply cannot afford this kind of policy. It is 
reminded that Russia26 (among the top-5 contributors to the CoE budget) has suspended its 
12-million euro contribution, while Turkey27 has recently threatened to significantly cut its 
funding towards the organisation. Not only do such financial limitations impose serious 
implications on the Organisation as a whole, as well as the functioning and viability of the 
                                                           
21 See eg, Jasna Selih, Ian Bond and Carl Dolan (n 9). 
22 European Commission, Monitoring the Application of European Union Law – 2016 Annual Report (Report, 6 
July 2017), available at <https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-
content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=COM%3A2017%3A370%3AFIN&from=EN>. 
23 European Commission, EU Budget 2016 – Financial Report (2017), available at 
<http://ec.europa.eu/budget/library/biblio/publications/2017/financial-report_en.pdf>. 
24 European Commission, Analysis of the Budgetary Implementation of the European Structural and Investment 
Funds in 2017 (May 2018), pp 40-41, available at 
<http://ec.europa.eu/budget/library/biblio/publications/2018/AnalysisBudgImplem_ESIF_2017_EN.pdf>. 
25 Laurent Pech and Kim Lane Scheppele (n 1) 42-44. 
26 See, http://assembly.coe.int/nw/xml/News/News-View-EN.asp?newsid=4982&cat=8. 
27 See, http://assembly.coe.int/nw/xml/News/News-View-en.asp?newsid=6808&lang=2. 
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ECtHR, which is already underperforming as a result of its unmanageable case overload, but 
they also make any proposal based on financial incentives simply utopian. 
 
Moral and normative concerns 
The next scepticism on the EC proposal has to do with the moral and normative aspect of 
the issue. International human rights theorists cannot simply disregard the moral or 
normative character of the obligation to respect human rights. From a moral point of view, 
how acceptable could it be to put a price on Member States’ human rights compliance?, one 
may ask. Can we really trade human rights with money? Although a moral obligation is not a 
coercive factor which could create legally binding effects, member States of the EU and the 
CoE are, at least, under a higher moral expectation (assumingly compared with non-member 
states) to conduct their domestic and international affairs by honouring their international 
commitments towards fundamental values and principles, which, afterall, represent “the 
common heritage of their peoples” (Preamble, Statute of the CoE) and the “humanist 
inheritance of Europe” (Preamble, TEU), are part of their common political traditions and 
ideals (Art 2, TEU) and are well-embedded in their own national constitutions.       
This scepticism could be extended over the normative dimension of the issue. Under a 
formalistic approach to the normativity of legal obligations, the above scepticism becomes 
even more compelling when considering that member States of a values-based international 
organisation are, as such, already bound by a strict a priori international legal obligation to 
respect and protect human rights. This legal obligation derives from the States’ voluntary 
consent to a particular international law, and thus their outright commitment to obey this 
law, when signing an international legal instrument to join the organisation. So, how can the 
EC offer EU member States access to funds in order to comply with a pre-existing legal 
obligation that they are already bound by? Arguably, from a pure formalistic, normative 
approach to law, this proposal is again problematic.  
 
VI. Concluding remarks 
The European Union is no longer a community of interests as it used to be in its early days. It 
has now become a community of values and principles. In sixty years of European 
integration, more and more emphasis is placed on the protection and promotion of 
fundamental values of human rights, democracy and the rule of law within the EU. As it was 
noted above, commitment to these fundamental values and principles has also become an 
essential part of the EU foreign policy, especially since the adoption of the EU Charter of 
fundamental rights. For instance, the EU is simply not inclined to sign any political or 
economic agreement with any partner or associate country unless an explicit reference to a 
commitment to certain EU values is made in the agreement. Similarly, candidate States 
willing to join the Union are subject to strict economic and political criteria, including an 
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obligation to show respect for EU fundamental values in their domestic and international 
undertakings (the so-called ‘Copenhagen criteria’, Art 49 TEU). The EC, in turn, thoroughly 
scrutinises their rule of law and human rights performance throughout the accession 
negotiations and pre-accession period. These criteria, however, should not be seen as a 
checklist of certain formalities that once met are to be forgotten post-accession. Instead, 
respect for and promotion of EU fundamental values and principles should be seen as a 
continuous pursuit which existing member States are under the legal obligation to always 
strive to achieve. It is thus essential for EU member States to realise that compliance with 
fundamental values does not cease to be important at the accession point, but, rather, it 
forms the cornerstone of the ongoing process of European integration. The growing 
emphasis on fundamental values compliance in EU’s foreign policy has arguably created the 
impression that the EU focuses more on the protection of these values by third countries, 
while compliance with this same obligation vis-à-vis the existing Member States has 
remained on the sidelines. What is fundamentally striking with the present EC proposal, 
therefore, is that for the first time ever in the history of the Union, EU values-linked 
economic incentives (to retain or gain access to EU funds) are offered to existing member 
States based on their rule of law and human rights performance, an already established 
responsibility for them both under the EU Treaties and Charter as well as their own national 
constitutional law. 
What is even more striking, however, is the pronounced refusal of certain member States 
(no coincidence that they are the same member States which have been targeted recently 
by the EC for non-compliance with certain values) to accept such proposal. This move 
impliedly admits that these member States are completely aware of their wrongdoings and 
rule of law underperformance and oppose to any kind of scrutiny from the EU even when 
such fundamentally important issues for the Union are at stake. It is therefore clear that the 
EC intends to develop an alternative, well-suited mechanism capable of addressing systemic 
rule of law violations in a more effective way. The proposed measure aims to put member 
States’ compliance with fundamental values under strict scrutiny in order to minimise or 
eliminate, if possible, the illiberal tendencies among them and the current backsliding from 
EU values within the Union. The measure is also expected to respond effectively to the all 
similar ‘rule of law crises’ revealing problems of a systemic nature which were brought to 
the surface by the numerous internal and external challenges that the EU has been facing 
during the last years. 
Although the present measure bears certain practical as well as conceptual limitations that 
prevent it from enjoying a wider acceptance, or even practical application, within the EU, it 
is believed that such a policy-based mechanism for the protection of human rights and other 
European values and principles should be seriously considered. This position is reinforced by 
the fact that existing enforcement mechanisms for the protection of human rights and the 
rule of law in Europe have already proven ineffective and/or insufficient. Not only does 
jeopardises the rule of law status at the national and European level, but it also negatively 
affects the functioning and success of these international organisations, as well as their 
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individual bodies, as it is the case with the European Court of Human Rights. Protecting 
fundamental values and principles should be placed right in the heart of all European 
policies. Policy-based measures, focusing on political or economic incentives might be 
capable of providing an appropriate and alternative response to the several and ongoing 
crises that the European societies have been facing during this decade. In any case, 
however, any policy-based approach for enhancing the protection of the European values 
should not merely be realistic and pragmatic and at the expense of the primary and 
principled obligation that member States have towards these values.     
 
 
 
 
 
 
